The Shawcross report I keep banging on about gives lots of examples of how Prevent failed in cases of Islamist terror attacks. The main terror threat to the UK is not far right, that’s a particular form of agenda pushing which the left promotes. Shawcross felt that radicalised Islamists were referred to the programme at a very late stage, sometimes when it was too late for any effective intervention. “Far right” referrals have often been because someone has said something perceived as racist, when they are at a very early stage of radicalisation. Shawcross also felt the far left should be considered more.
from the report (my bold)
3.46 While the products related to Islamist terrorism focus on the most serious material relating to violent Islamist ideology, mostly Islamic State and al-Qa’ida, much of the material covering extreme right-wing falls well below the threshold for even non-violent extremism.
3.47 This material tends to deal with broader themes and often covers content that relates to narratives on social media. These products not only covered non-violent far right extremism, but also examples of centre-right debate, populism, and controversial or distasteful forms of right-leaning commentary and intolerance. Some of this material falls well short of the extremism threshold altogether.
3.48 I saw one RICU analysis product from 2020 on right-wing terrorist and extremist activity online which referenced books by mainstream British conservative commentators as “key cultural nationalist ideological texts”. The same document listed “key texts” for white nationalists as including historic works of the Western philosophic and literary canon.
3.49 A RICU analysis product from 2019, which discussed a cohort of social media users it termed “actively patriotic and proud”, listed a prominent Conservative politician and former member of the government as being among figures “associated with far-right sympathetic audiences, and Brexit”.
3.50 Another RICU product about far-right radicalisation online named a highly popular American podcast host, claiming that this individual had been described as a gateway to the far right. It was suggested that he had hosted a disproportionate number of influencers from the “far right of the political spectrum,” although no examples were provided.
3.51 I do not consider the above to be appropriate subjects for RICU analysis or Prevent’s attention, particularly as little care was made to clarify that these mainstream conservatives should not actually be considered part of the far right themselves. The analysis products in question did not present sufficient or convincing evidence that this material is relevant to countering terrorism or meeting Prevent’s objectives. Their inclusion in RICU’s output is liable to confuse practitioners about where they should focus efforts to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.
3.52 I have seen nothing to suggest that RICU has formally adopted an official policy of applying radically different standards to different ideologies. In practice, however, the bar for what RICU includes on Islamism looks to be relatively high, whereas the bar for what is included on extreme right-wing is comparably low.
3.53 This risks creating false equivalence in the minds of Prevent practitioners about the scale and nature of the threats from extreme right-wing and Islamism. That makes it more difficult to respond proportionately to the unique challenges of these two different ideologies. It also short-changes those, such as Muslim communities, who are threatened by extreme right-wing terrorism and deserve a robust response to this threat. Conflating the dangers posed by the extreme right-wing with the vote to leave the European Union and the views of mainstream Conservative politicians fails to help provide that response.
3.54 This inconsistency goes to the heart of the fundamental question of how Prevent should approach ideology as part of its objective of tackling radicalisation.
3.55 RICU’s analysis products convey the sense that for the extreme right-wing, non-violent trends and narratives are of crucial importance, but that for Islamism, it is largely only the terrorist ideology and the narratives of the most serious jihadist groups that are relevant.