Here is a useful explainer on why employers who permit mixed sex facilities could be opening themselves up to discrimination cases:
https://taylorwalton.co.uk/insights/the-provision-of-single-sex-facilities-in-the-workplace/
The Supreme Court’s judgment determined that references to “sex” in the Equality Act 2010 are to a person’s biological sex only and not, for example, to their certified sex.
Following this reasoning, it is highly likely that the references to “men” and “women” in the Regulations are also to biological sex only. However, in any event, the exemption at paragraph 1(1)(a) of Schedule 23 of Equality Act 2010 exempts employers from liability where they do anything “in pursuance of an enactment”. Therefore, employers who provide toilets, washing facilities and/or changing rooms on a single-sex basis by reference to biological sex only can comfortably rely on this exemption in response to accusations of sex or gender reassignment discrimination.
The subsequent interim guidance issued by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) further clarifies that this means that trans women (biological men) should not be permitted to use women’s facilities and that trans men (biological women) should not be permitted to use men’s facilities.
Employers who were to provide these facilities on any other basis – such as allowing individuals to use facilities which correspond with their acquired or self-identifying gender – could not rely on this exemption if they were challenged by workers who objected to sharing facilities with members of the opposite biological sex.
And a legal opinion piece on why the approach taken by the SC to define sex in the EA2010 is likely to also be taken to define sex in the Workplace Regs:
The crux of the question which the Court addressed in relation to the Act was whether section 9(1) of the GRA, which provides that a person’s sex becomes the acquired sex for all purposes, was disapplied by the Act pursuant to the carve out to the general rule in section 9(3) GRA. The Court held that the Act did fall within section 9(3) and so sex was biological sex. In so holding, it gave general commentary on the meaning of the crucial section 9(3) wording.
It held that a piece of law can fall into the exception even if:
- it doesn’t have express wording to say that it does (the Act does not have such wording);
- it was enacted before the GRA (as in the case of the Health & Safety Regulations); and
- it doesn’t reach the relatively high threshold of necessary implication.
Instead, what one must assess is “the wording, context and policy of the statute in question. It is likely to be unhelpful for the coherence of the law to impose a stringent test for the application of section 9(3)” [108]. The Court later says ([156]) that section 9(3) applies where “the terms, context and purpose of the relevant enactment show that it does, because of a clear incompatibility or because its provisions are rendered incoherent or unworkable by the application of the rule in section 9(1)”.
In conclusion, while FWS did not explicitly address the Health & Safety Regulations and their definition of women and men, it set out an analytical approach to their statutory interpretation and a logical framework of argumentation with respect to the Act which can equally apply to the Health & Safety Regulations. This has not (yet) been the subject of direct and explicit determination by the Court, but it is hard to see the courts or tribunals – in light of FWS – suggesting that the definition of men and women in the Health & Safety Regulations differs from the Act, i.e. it is biological for both.
More generally, if it were to be found that the Health & Safety Regulations did mean certificated sex, then this would create significant confusion and inconsistency, and it seems unlikely that – absent very clear wording in the Health & Safety Regulations or other law about certificated sex (which is not there currently) – they would risk the fallout from such an interpretation. As the Court in FWS put it: “Indeed, it would offend against the principle of legal certainty and the need for a meaning which is constant and predictable, especially in the context of an Act with the purposes we have identified, and which has such practical everyday consequences for so many individuals and organisations in society” ([175]). The Court was talking there about consistency intra the Act, but it is an observation with equal force as a public policy desideratum inter leges.
www.doyleclayton.co.uk/resources/insights/do-workplaces-need-to-provide-single-biological-sex-toilets/