The Disclosure and Barring Service plays a vital and unique role in safeguarding. By processing criminal record checks for individuals who have applied to work in roles where safeguarding considerations apply, the DBS allows organisations to access key information that will assist them in making safer recruiting decisions. The ability of a DBS check to play this role in safeguarding rests entirely on the relevance, completeness and accuracy of the information returned and displayed on the DBS certificate.
In December 2003, Ian Huntley was convicted of the murders of two 10-year old girls, Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells. At the time of committing the murders, Huntley had been employed at a local college as a caretaker, a position that facilitated his access to children. Although he had previously come into contact with the police over alleged sexual offences on many occasions, this information had not been disclosed during the vetting check carried out at the time of his appointment.
It is no exaggeration to say that the murders of the two girls and the subsequent discovery that Huntley should, and could, have been prevented from taking up the role of caretaker had a profound effect throughout the country. In 2004, following an independent inquiry, the Bichard Inquiry Report was published. This concluded that there had been extensive omissions and failures in the vetting process.
Significantly, Huntley had been able to change his name by deed poll to Ian Nixon and the criminal record check he underwent had only been carried out against this new identity. By presenting a new identity, Huntley had successfully severed the link with his existing police records meaning that the records held against the name ‘Ian Huntley’ were not disclosed.
Eighteen years later and safeguarding loopholes created where applicants submit identity documents for DBS checks that display a new identity remain.
Although the government has acknowledged the safeguarding loophole created where registered sex offenders are able to change their name by deed poll, the ability to change identity in a more fundamental way, by simultaneously changing both name and gender, remains unaddressed. Any individual can easily, and for any reason, change their name and gender on documents commonly used to establish identity via a process of self-declaration. These documents, that include passport and driving licence, can be presented for the purposes of a DBS check and will show the individual’s new name and their acquired gender instead of, and as opposite to, their sex.
The DBS grants enhanced privacy rights to individuals who change their gender when changing their identity. These are exceptional rights that are only granted to individuals from this group. The result is that identity verification is compromised, meaning that there is no guarantee that the information returned during the check and displayed on the certificate will be accurate or complete.
These exceptional privacy rights also allow an applicant who has changed gender to request that all their previous names are withheld from the DBS certificate that is issued. This right to conceal previous identities is not given to anyone else: disclosing previous identities is a key component of safeguarding and DBS certificates issued to all other individuals display all other names the applicant has used.
Applicants who change their gender are also permitted to conceal their sex and the DBS certificate issued will display their acquired gender instead. This right is not granted to any other individual: the importance of sex to safeguarding means that for all other applicants, their sex is always displayed.
These are all serious risks to safeguarding that compromise the validity and reliability of the DBS regime.
As digital identities are rolled out, including for DBS checks, the risk is that the existing loopholes will simply be perpetuated in the digital realm. In the drive for convenience and ease of use, digital identities also risk creating a new safeguarding loophole. In-person identity verification acts as a safeguarding protection in and of itself, yet digital identities can be shared remotely, meaning that this important step is removed.
The current operation of the DBS regime means that identity verification is compromised and organisations requesting DBS checks cannot have confidence in the information that is disclosed. In order to close these existing loopholes, we propose three recommendations:
- Mandatory use of National Insurance numbers for DBS checks and all identity changes
- DBS certificates display sex registered at birth
- DBS certificates display other names used for all applicants, including those who have changed gender as part of changing identity
In order to be effective, the rules of safeguarding must apply equally to everyone. Whenever the members of one group are excused from the normal requirements of safeguarding, a loophole is created that is ripe for exploitation.