Gender Ideaology vs Religious Ideaolgy

[Bunnyasmyname]

I follow my faith and consider myself pretty religious, however it struck me that many consider all this trans/gender identity movement as some kind of religion.
Upon reflection, it does indeed have some comparisons.

I am now wondering what other religious feminists thought. Is it just the addition of faith or the millennia of sacred scripture that separates ‘real’ religions? Is this how it was for the early Christians when their religion was emerging?
How does one justify belief in God and yet decry this other ideology?

Apologies for my clumsiness - English isn’t my first language, but I hope you get the gist of what I am trying to say!

Lots of religious systems don't really believe in free will, sure. And there are certain moral approaches they take because of that.

But grounding an ethics in scientific naturalism is damn hard. Or rather, an ethics that looks anything like the ethics that most of us would accept. Naturalistic ethics tend to give a kind of social darwinism, and I don't think I've ever seen anything like an even slightly convincing argument for free will from that position. More often it's ignored. I suspect that is why modern sj tends to struggle with good and evil at the level of the individual.

But grounding an ethics in scientific naturalism is damn hard. Or rather, an ethics that looks anything like the ethics that most of us would accept.

Quite. Consider eugenics.

That doesn't exhaust possibilities, though. Perhaps have a look at (neo-?)Aristotelianism, if you want a non-theist ethics?
(There's a lot of it about these days ...)

This 'can be neither proven nor disproven' schtick is popular but wrong.

There are lots of proofs. For theism, try Epicurus for example:
"Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?"

... For gender identity, maybe check out Alex Byrne (at MIT):
' If there is some kind of “gender identity” that is universal in humans, and which causes dysphoria when mismatched with sex, it remains elusive. No one has yet found a way of detecting its presence, and verifying that it is causally responsible for dysphoria .'

... And, as I say, there are lots more: many proofs, many different sorts.

You're more-or-less right in locating 'the problem', as you put it, though. We tolerate other false beliefs (theism for instance), so perhaps we should tolerate belief in gender-identity too. But societal/legal and personal toleration should go only as far as that allowed to other false beliefs (such as theism). Gender-identity believers want more than this, which we certainly should not allow.

Yes you can. But you need to be explicit and explain extremely carefully why they are comparable and match up with the accepted definitions of a cult.

You cant just make the accusation without clear cavets about why it is appropriate.

We have crossed this bridge on MN.

*But grounding an ethics in scientific naturalism is damn hard. Or rather, an ethics that looks anything like the ethics that most of us would accept.

Quite. Consider eugenics.

That doesn't exhaust possibilities, though. Perhaps have a look at (neo-?)Aristotelianism, if you want a non-theist ethics?
(There's a lot of it about these days ...)*

It doesn't exhaust the possibilities, no, but it is one of the possibilities.

There's no guarantee that ethics grounded in science will result in eugenics, just as there's no guarantee that allowing transwmen to use women's facilities will result in women being sexually assaulted.

These are possibilities that must be considered when assessing an ethical or ideological framework.

@gidabo

This 'can be neither proven nor disproven' schtick is popular but wrong.

There are lots of proofs. For theism, try Epicurus for example:
"Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?"

In theory there may be strong "proof" arguments you could have.

In practice, people may think that the arguments have only had modest results, and haven't really given us an answer as to whether some type of religious worldview may be correct.

So in general there may be unanswered questions, many people could think, even if perhaps there are strong arguments against particular religions and their particular "scriptures" and "gods".

With the logical problem of evil, I'm sure this stuff is still controversial, but I think in the 20th century the most prominent atheist philosopher that was pushing the logical problem of evil was J. L. Mackie; and he apparently admitted that he had been defeated by Plantinga on the theist side. Mackie may still have thought that the issue was a problem for theism, but apparently conceded that he had failed to show strict logical inconsistency.

Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.

Is it malevolent to allow free will? Or is there a line where free will should be halted (as opposed to commands not to do things, punishment for disobeying, and rewards for obeying)? The ‘point’ of most religions is how to overcome the problem of evil that arises out of free will; how to gain access to God/nivarna that personal ‘evils’ prevent.

As far as I know, you will not find any of the well known atheists defending a strong (libertarian) form of free will that would be required for moral responsibility.

By "moral responsibility", I mean that if an agent has no real power to, for example, avoid murdering someone, then that's destroying moral responsibility. You can still put them in prison as a deterrent, and say they "acted freely" in some sort of sense; but they aren't really going to be responsible for the crime as a moral agent.

Some philosophers may still try to defend a strong form of free will under naturalism.

Naturalism doesn't have to say that physical things are the only type of thing that exist, but it will place emphasis and primacy on the physical world.

So with naturalism, they need to argue that a physical system can develop to the point, where you get an emergent property, that is somehow outside the ordinary physical laws.

That some religions aren't interested in these questions I don't think tells us much.

grounding an ethics in scientific naturalism is damn hard. Or rather, an ethics that looks anything like the ethics that most of us would accept.

As opposed to all the lovely fluffy ethics grounded in theism? Modern secular ethics tends not to be too keen on the 'kill the unbeliever' stuff found in many god-based moral codes, for example. Or rape for 'righteous' reasons. Or slavery, and the subjugation of women and 'lesser' groups.

Plenty of societies throughout history have had ethical systems not based on gods - even if they had supernatural entities of some description, those weren't necessarily interested in what humans got up to or on setting rules for behaviour. The Norse, Hellenic and Roman ones were usually busy with their own affairs, Buddhist ethics is non-theistic, animist spirits tend not to care what people get up to as long as we aren't destroying their own personal tree or rock ...

As @gidabo osays, it's not a straight choice between theism and science.

There's no guarantee that ethics grounded in science will result in eugenics

There's no guarantee that one grounded in theism won't.

As for free will - that is far easier to argue for without interventionist gods. In a non-theist system will is automatically considered to be free because there is no supernatural influence. What is the constraining force that makes will unfree?

I hadn't really intended to get into this at all. But, well, I suppose I owe a response. Let's not re-invent any philosophical wheels here, though. You might kick off with Stanford - there's a good survey piece there by Michael Tooley: The Problem of Evil.

(Generally I suppose I'd thought of Plantinga vs Mackie as a bit of a sideshow; it's not really my field (although, sure, everything is connected). But, anyway, look ...)

"Plantinga’s view," Tooley asserts, "... is very implausible." (1.3), in that it "ignore[s] the most plausible and challenging versions of the argument."

Tooley then goes on to give a valid proof of the conclusion "God does not exist" (1.4) focusing on, as he says, "... quite concrete types of evil", which wholly sidesteps Plantinga's strictures on Mackie. He (Tooley), then suggests how we might make the argument sound by replacing axiological premises in it by appropriate deontological ones.

(Personally I suppose I'd like to try to do it more on a virtue-theoretic basis, but anyway Tooley's thing works on its own terms, for sure. (He even gives a formal proof of validity: No God Proof, which may be fun for any neophyte logicians reading the thread.))

So there's a way Epicurus' proof can be maintained, if you like.

As I said earlier, the point at issue just here is not the status of any given proof. It's really just that the (I reckon mostly unthinking) response of "Well, we can't prove matters either way ..." is mistaken.

Such a response, in my experience, can tend to lead to a kind of lazy relativism, in which answers to questions such as "Is there such a thing as gender identity (or god, or immortal souls, guardian angels etc.)?" end up seen as a matter of taste, to be answered whimsically if at all, rather than as matters of fact to be answered by ... well, by reason and/or experience, if you like: rationally, anyway.

Such whimsy, in case it's not clear, is bad. Bad for the individual and bad for society.

Try to get reasons for your beliefs, if you can. Of course, if you can't, it may be agnosticism is a sensible point of view. But even then, don't give up trying to find decisive reasons one way or another.

(Sorry that's a bit preachy. But, well, it's what I believe. You may disagree.)

Oh, and there is no such thing as gender identity. No matter what some people think, that's a fact. And humans can't change sex. Another fact.

I wouldn't really call Aristotelianism non-theistic.

Yes.

Modern western people tend to come at this question from the side that says, there is evil, so that challenges the idea of a good God.

But that's flipped in most traditional religions. They say, we see around us that there is evil and suffering, how can that be so unless there is such a thing as Good?

@gidabo

"Plantinga’s view," Tooley asserts, "...is very implausible." (1.3), in that it "ignore[s] the most plausible and challenging versions of the argument."

Tooley then goes on to give a valid proof of the conclusion "God does not exist" (1.4) focusing on, as he says, "...quite concrete types of evil", which wholly sidesteps Plantinga's strictures on Mackie. He (Tooley), then suggests how we might make the argument sound by replacing axiological premises in it by appropriate deontological ones.

...

So there's a way Epicurus' proof can be maintained, if you like.

Your source puts forward that argument, but in the next section, says that it's not really going to work as a stronger style logical incompatibility argument, and suggests that we need to switch to a more modest style of evidential argument.

So according to your source, we don't have anything as strong as a "proof" here.

As I said earlier, the point at issue just here is not the status of any given proof. It's really just that the (I reckon mostly unthinking) response of "Well, we can't prove matters either way..." is mistaken.

I could maybe kind of agree with you; but on the other side, we will probably still be having similar arguments over religion in a thousand years from now.

in most traditional religions. They say, we see around us that there is evil and suffering, how can that be so unless there is such a thing as Good?

That makes no sense whatsoever as an argument.

And none of this is any use in answering the OP's question.

@PorcelinaV
So according to your source, we don't have anything as strong as a "proof" here.

You're right, in a way. It depends on whether we think evidential arguments can be probative, I suppose. (A verbal dispute?)

I could maybe kind of agree with you; but on the other side, we will probably still be having similar arguments over religion in a thousand years from now.

Indeed, yes, any hope of religion dying out seems likely to be dashed. Evil continues to triumph?

Thanks for the discussion.

To lower the level of academic argument 😏 I shall quote the Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy:

"The argument goes something like this: 'I refuse to prove that I exist,' says God, 'for proof denies faith, and without faith, I am nothing. ' 'But, says Man, the Babel fish is a dead giveaway, isn't it? It could not have evolved by chance. It proves you exist, and, by your own arguments, you don't.

And poof, it all disappears in a flash of logic....

😂

@BinturongsSmellOfPopcorn

As opposed to all the lovely fluffy ethics grounded in theism? Modern secular ethics tends not to be too keen on the 'kill the unbeliever' stuff found in many god-based moral codes, for example. Or rape for 'righteous' reasons. Or slavery, and the subjugation of women and 'lesser' groups.

I think there is a couple of distinct issues here.

Firstly, there is "grounding" in the sense of what exactly moral claims mean; in what sense do moral truths exist, and whether a theory is going to have "morality" then be meaningful and valuable to typical humans.

Secondly, you have the question of what particular moral systems or principles you are using, and how do we know what is morally correct whether generally or in controversial cases.

So there is a practical problem, with false religions, that give false moral instructions, that they are potentially dangerous.

However I think that's distinct from the "grounding" issue.

Maybe you could even argue, that one reason false religions are potentially dangerous, is because they take advantage of the superior grounding of morality that theism has!

I think the two are a very good comparison.

Someone else's beliefs should in no way compel me to share them. Nor should I be punished for not sharing them or for voicing disagreement with them.

It should be ok to say I don't believe X and I don't want X to be made mandatory for me to pretend I believe without being imprisoned, stoned, beheaded or burned at the stake for it.

How are you defining a 'false' religion, @PorcelinaV ?

It's a pretty basic question in moral philosophy - when you say something is evil, what is that in relation to?

It's the question of grounding, as a pp said. The metaphysical basis of morality.

Evil implies good - but not necessarily Good.

Just to add that, according to many psychologists, even if there is no God, we would still need to invent one. People behave better when they are being watched, and, crucially, groups fare better when they are religious as opposed to secular. Humans need community, and religions create communities. There's plenty of research behind this.

So in terms of gender, I suppose it's a form of human groupishness that has evolved behind the quasi-spiritual concept of gendered souls. And the moral framework it comes from is that of the critical social justice movement, combined with the narcissism of individualism as created by extreme versions of neoliberal economics.