KPSS Executive Summary
Since the passing of the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill at the end of December 2022, “legal sex”, and related concepts, have become established in debate, with the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA2004) being described as enabling “legal sex change”. In tandem, and with the intention of protecting the sex-based rights of women and girls, there have been calls that this necessitates a qualification of the protected characteristic “sex” in the Equality Act 2010 (EA2010), amending it to “biological sex”.
However, our position is that this understanding of GRA2004 is erroneous and overstates the effect of a gender recognition certificate, that “legal sex” has been misconceptualised, and that, whilst clarification of the law is desirable, qualifying “sex” in legislation in any way is unnecessary, has undesirable consequences and carries significant risk throughout domestic legislation, as well as to sex-based rights under international law.
We argue that GRA2004 does not operate to effect a “change of legal sex”. Rather, this “Act to make provision for and in connection with change of gender” enables a qualifying individual to obtain legal recognition of their “acquired gender”, with resultant legal consequence related to that individual’s legal status. Our position is supported by a reading of GRA2004, prior case law and the wording on a full GRC.
The consequence of the legal status of an “acquired gender” is unclear, in particular where it comes into conflict with rights of men and women on the basis of sex. This lack of clarity, together with concerns about privacy have acted to obscure sex in law. In tandem, the meaning of the term “gender” in law now lacks certainty and, given the social trend to use the terms sex and gender interchangeably, requires clarification.
Whilst we agree that “legal sex” is a concept that has legal standing, our position is that an individual’s legal sex is simply the legal registration by the State of their sex as observed at birth which forms part of their legal identity. This registration is fixed and unchanging, just as sex observed at birth is immutable.
Hence, GRA2004 could not, by definition, effect a change of “legal sex”. Section 9(2) clarifies that this registration of “legal sex” remains an event unaffected by the grant of a GRC. Indeed, the operation of the exceptions to legal recognition of acquired gender in section 9(3) depends on the persistence of this “legal sex”. If a GRC holder underwent a “change of legal sex”, that individual would effectively be able to claim that they had legal recognition of both sexes, male and female, one as registered at birth and the opposite as “changed” in accordance with GRA2004. This is incoherent and legally undesirable.
When legislation refers to “sex” it is referring to the registered sex observed at birth of persons legally recognised in law via State registration. In EA2010, “sex” was not left unqualified due to error, omission or confusion. It was also not replaced with the adjacent term “gender”. Rather, there was no need to qualify what sex is in law: it is a fact registered at birth and part of a person’s registered legal identity and there is no basis in legislation for any other interpretation of “sex”.
The contrary position, with which we disagree, sees “sex” in legislation split into an unchangeable aspect (“biological sex”) and a changeable aspect (“legal sex”). Splitting sex into two separate concepts in this way means that for any individual and at any time, whilst their “biological sex” is fixed, public and (in the overwhelming majority of circumstances) known, their “legal sex” is changeable, private and, unless and until declared, unknown. This complication creates uncertainty and impacts data collection. If robust data on sex registered at birth is not being collected, it is impossible to measure and address discrimination against women on the basis of sex.
It is unnecessary to clarify that “sex” in legislation means “biological sex” and it is also undesirable because the very act of adding a prefix or qualifier implies that “sex” has been, or may be, split into separate concepts, with each prefix requiring a stable definition. In our view such a move results in more uncertainty, not less, that due to the interwoven nature of legislation and policy will have an inevitable widespread impact.
Registration and recording of sex at birth, as a key demographic statistic of significant importance for policy decisions, is a legitimate function of the State. Yet, disrupting “sex” in this way operates to break the system of sex registration at birth upon which legal protections for women are founded.
Introduction to longer document at https://kpssinfo.org/sex-and-gender-in-legislation-pdf/