An interesting excerpt from this Parliamentary committee meeting:
Women and Equalities Committee
Oral evidence: Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill and Equality Act 2010, HC 1098
Tuesday 31 January 2023
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 31 January 2023.
Watch the meeting
Members present: Caroline Nokes (Chair); Elliot Colburn; Caroline Dinenage; Rachel Maclean; Kate Osborne; Ms Anum Qaisar.
Questions 1 - 55 Witnesses
I: Naomi Cunningham, Barrister, Outer Temple Chambers; Lord Falconer of Thoroton, KC; Dr Michael Foran, Lecturer in Public Law, University of Glasgow; and Robin Moira White, Barrister, Old Square Chambers.
Written evidence from witnesses:
committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/12639/pdf/
Chair: Can I just finish with Lord Falconer? This could be a yes or no:
would it be helpful if there were a definition of sex in the Equality Act?
Dr Foran: There already is one.
Chair: There is an understanding of it. There is not a specific definition.
Dr Foran: Sex is if you are a man or a woman, and then the definition of man is a male of any age, and the definition of a woman is a female of any age. They have the definition. What they do not have is clarity.
Chair: The Haldane judgment interpreted that differently.
Dr Foran: Yes, it did. The Haldane—
Chair: Following the Haldane judgment, would it be helpful if that were
revisited?
Dr Foran: Absolutely. The issue with the Haldane judgment as it arises for all the purposes that we are dealing with here is that up until that point, we were really not sure whether or not sex in the Equality Act, as modified by a GRA, first, does modify the Equality Act for the purposes of the claimant, somebody who has a gender recognition certificate, whether they would be classed as male or female for the purposes of a direct discrimination claim. The Haldane judgment goes further than that because it says, effectively, that the definition of sex in the entire Act becomes legal sex. That means that single sex spaces become single legal sex spaces, and what it then means is your justification for exclusion will hinge partially upon whether or not the person is of the characteristic legally that that space is. The test is the same. It is still a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, but whether or not you are legally the same person of a space or a service that is set up for that legal category, not biological category, will be relevant for determining whether or not exclusion is proportionate. The proportionality—
Q27 Chair: Lord Falconer, do you want to comment on that?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: Michael has made it incredibly complicated. The Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill does not change the basis on which you make a determination on whether or not—
Dr Foran: No, it changes whether or not you can sue. The policy arguments will not be changed. You could introduce a policy that bans all males from female prisons if you want, but you could be sued for that. You could be sued for gender recognition discrimination. The question about whether or not you have a gender recognition certificate changes the nature of that suit that you make from an indirect discrimination claim to a direct discrimination claim, subject to the same justification test. Is it a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? If you think a court will possibly come to a conclusion that the exclusion of this legal woman who is biologically male and that there is a less onerous way to achieve the legitimate aim of providing security then the policy will be struck down as unlawful. If you want to ensure with absolute certainty that no rapist makes it into a women’s jail, you need a blanket ban, and blanket bans can be struck down by courts. You need to legislate to have that ban in place. Policy documents, guidance, will not do it because the legislative framework is as it is and it is hooked on to a proportionality test.
Chair: Elliot, did you have a question you wanted to put?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: Could I just come back as Michael slightly cut me off.
Dr Foran: Sorry. I apologise for that.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: What he said was so misguided. Can I try and make this real? Suppose you were the prison Minister, as I was, in relation to this. You have got to address this on a factual basis. It does not matter whether you have a gender recognition certificate or not. You have to work out whether it is safe for somebody and that is exactly the way the courts will approach it. This idea that the GRC is going to make the difference is complete academic nonsense. The prison Minister has got to address himself to the question of what is the basis upon which I let somebody into the female estate if they are a trans woman. The recent case in Scotland indicates you would never let somebody in those circumstances in, and that is the announcement Brandon Lewis or Dominic Raab made in October. None of this is changed by the Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill. You have to just look at it on the base of the facts on the ground at a particular time.
Naomi Cunningham: Can I come back in please?
Chair: Yes.
Naomi Cunningham: I am not an academic. I am a practitioner of some horrible number of years’ experience in discrimination law, and I completely agree with Michael that the possession of a GRC makes it more complex. Lord Falconer is half right—
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: More complex.
Chair: Can we please be polite to other witnesses? Thank you, Lord
Falconer.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I apologise. I do apologise.
Naomi Cunningham: Thank you. Lord Falconer is half right in that a gender recognition certificate is not simply an access all areas pass. A gender recognition certificate has not made the difference to the Scottish prisons policy because the exceptions that allow service providers, public authorities, employers, schools, etc, to discriminate on grounds of sex and gender reassignment when it is necessary for them to do so are permissive not compulsory, and it is starting to look as if they ought to be compulsory because they are now coming under so much pressure, but under the Equality Act, as it stands, they are permissive not compulsory. Something like the prison service can perfectly lawfully operate a policy that does not make proper use of those permissive exceptions allowing discrimination.
The problem comes when a service provider or public authority etc tries to and wants to do the right thing and provide a single sex service when it is necessary and is faced with a man who identifies as a woman who says, “That’s not lawful. You are discriminating against me.” If he does not have a gender recognition certificate, the answer is very plain and simple. The answer is, “Sorry, you are a man. As far as the law is concerned, you are a man. You do not have a gender recognition certificate. You are legally male. This is a women-only space, a women- only service etc. You cannot come in and that is a flat, simple answer.” That is easy for any little service provider to operate.
If that same man has a gender recognition certificate declaring him to be a woman, the situation is very different. At that point, it is no longer sex discrimination—which is, by definition, permitted if it is a lawful single sex space or service—it becomes gender reassignment discrimination and then it has to be specifically justified. We can argue about whether that is necessarily case by case or policy by policy, but it is more complicated. The legal route is more complicated. For a small organisation especially, but we have actually seen for larger organisations, it is pretty daunting. They need to take legal advice. They probably cannot afford it. They do not really understand what the issues are. They may well think, faced with a man saying, “My birth certificate says I’m a woman” that they have just got to give way and let him in even if that means their core