relating to the way in which a living organism or bodily part functions.
So it is the opposite of anatomy; it is about function, not form.
Mindboggling that a person could propose to change their physiology, e.g. by taking hormones, but not their anatomy (i.e. no surgery) and still meet the definition in the act.
Makes you wonder who drafted this and with what intentions.
I think it is more likely to be "unintended consequences" as far as hormones are concerned. The original idea was that "transsexuals" were people who had had surgery, which would also result in a change in function, eg. no lactation after a double mastectomy, no pregnancy after sterilisation, no sperm production after the chop. Most countries that had any legal recognition of transsexuals required sterilisation first but this has gradually changed with appeals to Human Rights Legislation.
I think, but am happy to be corrected, that the term "gender reassignment" comes from European Court rulings using that phrase which prompted an addition to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 by means of The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999, made under the European Communities Act.
I haven't been able to track down any instances of "physiological or other attributes of sex" before it appeared in the 1999 Statutory Instrument so perhaps it was introduced by whoever drafted it for the relevant Secretary of State, looking for a fancier way of referring to "physical characteristics" or "physical attributes"?
STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
1999 No. 1102
SEX DISCRIMINATION
The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999
Discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment
2.—(1) After section 2 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975(3) (“the 1975 Act”) there shall be inserted the following section—
““Discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment.”
(3) In section 82 of the 1975 Act (general interpretation provisions) in subsection (1) after the definition of “further education” there shall be inserted the following definition—
““gender reassignment” means a process which is undertaken under medical supervision for the purpose of reassigning a person’s sex by changing physiological or other characteristics of sex, and includes any part of such a process;”.
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/1102/made
The 1999 Statutory Instrument was introduced to comply with a European ruling that includes the phrases "physical characteristics", "physical attributes" and "belonging physically to one sex":
Judgment of the Court of 30 April 1996. - P v S and Cornwall County Council. - Reference for a preliminary ruling: Industrial Tribunal, Truro - United Kingdom. - Equal treatment for men and women - Dismissal of a transsexual. - Case C-13/94.
THE COURT,
in answer to the questions referred to it by the Industrial Tribunal, Truro, by order of 11 January 1994, hereby rules:
In view of the objective pursued by Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, Article 5(1) of the directive precludes dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to a gender reassignment.
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:61994CJ0013
There is a summary of relevant European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings here - it doesn't include the P v S and Cornwall County Council case so maybe that was not a ECHR ruling but another European Court, I do find all these different European courts rather confusing:
European Court of Human Rights Factsheet – Gender identity issues
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Gender_identity_ENG.pdf
Anyway, it all started with this one, which is a fascinating read.
CASE OF REES v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Application no. 9532/81)
JUDGMENT, STRASBOURG 17 October 1986
12. At birth the applicant possessed all the physical and biological characteristics of a child of the female sex, and was consequently recorded in the register of births as a female, under the name Brenda Margaret Rees. However, already from a tender age the child started to exhibit masculine behaviour and was ambiguous in appearance. In 1970, after learning that the transsexual state was a medically recognised condition, she sought treatment. She was prescribed methyl testosterone (a hormonal treatment) and started to develop secondary male characteristics.
14. Surgical treatment for physical sexual conversion began in May 1974 with a bilateral masectomy and led to the removal of feminine external characteristics.
16. On 10 November 1980 his solicitor wrote to the Registrar General making a formal request under Section 29(3) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, on the ground that there had been "a mistake in completing the Register". In support of his request, the applicant submitted a medical report by Dr. C.N. Armstrong. The report stated that, in Dr. Armstrong’s opinion, of the four criteria of sex - namely chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, apparent sex (external genitalia and body form) and psychological sex, the last was the most important as it determined the individual’s social activities and role in adult life, and it was also, in his view, pre-determined at birth, though not evident until later in life. Dr. Armstrong considered that as the applicant’s psychological sex was male, he should be assigned male.
On 25 November the Registrar General refused the application to alter the Register. He stated that the report on the applicant’s psychological sex was not decisive and that, "in the absence of any medical report on the other agreed criteria (chromosomal sex, gonadal sex and apparent sex)", he was "unable to consider whether an error (had been) made at birth registration in that the child was not of the sex recorded". No further evidence in support of the applicant’s request was subsequently submitted.
Not a mention of "gender" anywhere in the ruling; "psychological sex" is referred to with some scepticism and operations are for "sexual reassignment".
Rees lost the case to have birth registration and certificates altered to reflect "psychological sex" but the fact that the "sexual reassignment" operation (double mastectomy) and other "medical treatments" had been on the NHS was interpreted as weighing in favour of "legal sex" being altered.
The two different meanings of "identity" in this paragraph show how things were starting to get muddled:
41. The Commission additionally relied on the fact that the United Kingdom, through its free national health service, had borne the costs of the surgical operations and other medical treatment which the applicant had been enabled to undergo. They considered that this medical recognition of the necessity to assist him to realise his identity must be regarded as a further argument for the legal recognition of the change in his sexual identity; failure to do so had the effect that the applicant was treated as an ambiguous being.
"realise his identity" - Rees (female) has a "male identity" ("psychological sex"?) that the body must be modified to reflect
"change in his sexual identity" - from female to male ("apparent sex"?)
As far as European Law and UK Law are concerned this looks like the first attempt to enshrine "gender identity" as the determiner of legal sex, although back in 1986 it was referred to as "psychological sex".