I found an interesting Lords debate on the equality bill. An amendment was proposed to add a requirement for medical supervision to the definition of gender reassignment. So many of the points raised in the opening speech are things which have proven to be massive issues today:
The Lord Bishop of Chichester (on behalf of the Lord Bishop of Chester) - ... but this amendment has a different purpose. It asks that transgendering or transgendered people, claiming the legal protection of this Bill, would need to be or have been under the supervision of a qualified medical practitioner, which is the present situation. The promoters of this amendment certainly do not object to the inclusion of gender reassignment as a protected characteristic. I know from my own experience as a priest and pastor that those who suffer from gender dysphoria are in a particularly vulnerable position in society, which in many cases can be quite acute. To find oneself in a gender which one believes and experiences to be a false characterisation, possessing physical characteristics that one does not recognise as one’s own, is a situation that most of us would find hard to imagine.
There are some within and without different faith communities who doubt the possibility of genuine gender reassignment. Views vary within and between the churches and other communities on this matter and its implications for such matters as ordination or marriage. Some of my colleagues—including, so he tells me, my right reverend friend in whose stead I stand—would be willing in principle to ordain such a person or to solemnise their marriage in their new gender. Others would not, but we would all recognise the uncertainties and ambiguities which lead different people to different conclusions.
Although some scientific and legal aspects of the situation remain unclear, I hope that all noble Lords will share a sense of care and compassion for those in this situation. This amendment is not, however, about our individual attitudes or beliefs on the matter but about the rights of citizens to fair treatment and respect for their personal identity. Of course, one of the most headline-catching aspects of gender reassignment is the question of the surgery which forms part of some, although not all, cases. Normally, medical surgery removes diseased or dead tissue. Transgendering surgery removes what would otherwise present as healthy tissue, but of course that “otherwise” is absolutely critical. That is the problem, and it leads some people to question the authenticity of the condition of gender dysphoria—or, at least, the recourse to radical surgery in order to address it.
The Bill refers to people who are proposing to undergo, are undergoing or have undergone a process of gender reassignment, but to what does that “process” refer? It might seem to imply a formal process, overseen by the medical profession, but paragraph 64 of the Explanatory Notes states that the clause changes the existing requirements,
“by no longer requiring a person to be under medical supervision”,
in order,
“to come within it”.
What, then, is the process that is envisaged? Are we talking merely about self-certification that one is in the process of reassigning one’s gender? That is what the Explanatory Notes say, and to many of us that seems to carry the notion of individual rights too far, because it detaches them too much from the rights of others and the ultimate good of the wider community. Toggle showing location ofColumn 380It is one thing to make proper provision for those suffering from gender dysphoria; it is another to enshrine in law the principle that one’s gender is a matter of personal choice. Moreover, would this change not lay the provisions of the Bill open to potential abuse? Would it not make the legal question of who is or is not proposing to undergo, undergoing or has undergone a process of gender reassignation so vague as to make the work of a tribunal potentially very difficult indeed?
There are obvious practical problems with the clause. Does wider society not have the right to require that somebody in these circumstances, if they are to claim the legal protection which society can afford, should be under the supervision of a medical practitioner? That would guard against potential abuse of the provisions and give clear guidance to the courts concerning who is or is not potentially protected by the Bill.
To be under medical supervision would not require that any particular medical procedures have been carried out or are in prospect. People can, after all, undergo gender reassignment without surgical intervention. Nor would people need legally to reassign their gender in order to come under the protection of the Bill; they would simply need the supportive supervision of a medical practitioner, and to have got to that point in the process before claiming the formal protection of this law. To accept this amendment would not, of course, justify discriminatory behaviour towards those who are not under medical supervision, but it would mean that the formal support of the law could be claimed only by those whose sense of compulsion to reassign their gender had a degree of recognition and support by the medical profession.
I finish on a more general point that may be the most fundamental of all. The Bill appears to reduce gender identity to a matter of personal and individual choice. If so, are there wider problems beyond the specific and specialised issue of transgendering in such a move? We often dwell in our debates on the social consequence of family breakdown and the general confusion over human relationships in our society, and it is usually the children who suffer most, as the recent Second Reading debate on the Child Poverty Bill made plain once again.
The constitution of the human race as male and female is fundamental—equal and different. Certainly, the genetic and physiological differences between male and female are far greater than the other protected characteristics. Furthermore, it seems significant that people usually have an awareness of themselves as either male or female. There is no protected characteristic of being neither male nor female, or the androgynous state of being both male and female. Most people have a sense of being or wanting to be one or the other. Would giving legal protection to transgendering or transgender people on their self-certification alone serve further to undermine a proper sense of the differentiation of male and female and, therefore, equality? It is too important an issue for wider society to be regarded merely as a matter of individual decision and self-certification.
These more general concerns undergird the practical considerations that I outlined earlier. Would it not be safer all round—not least in relation to young people, Toggle showing location ofColumn 381who often feel confusion about their gender as well as their sexuality—to continue to encourage the proper support and supervision of the medical profession; and to require this if legal protection against discrimination is to be invoked? It seems as though there is some confusion over whether the intention is to give protection to those who are seriously engaged in gender reassignment—which is how the clause sounds and, indeed, how it appears in the title—or whether, in accordance with the notes, it is designed to give protection to all and sundry, including those who are experimenting with cross-dressing.
Young people are most vulnerable in all this, not least because there are those who may experiment, suffer confusion about sexual identity and orientation, and need every encouragement to seek professional help. This is, at this stage, a probing amendment, designed to clarify what the Government intend in amending the Sex Discrimination Act by removing the requirement for medical supervision. I beg to move.
hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2010-01-11/debates/10011139000077/EqualityBill#contribution-10011146000033
And guess what? All the issues raised were hand-waved away.