Professor Andrew Koppelman is one of those who believes that courts need to decide based on an amalgam of the law and current day political thinking. But that's not what (arguably) courts are for, they are supposed to decide according to the law and it's for the legislature to identify where the law is out of alignment
In the UK courts it's a bit of both.
I remember the notorious divorce case from a few years ago (Owens v Owens) that went all the way to the Supreme Court where a woman was refused a divorce.
In the court of appeal, the judge said that the court was there to "state the law, not make the law":-
This is the law which it was the duty of Judge Tolson to apply. It is the law which it is equally our duty to apply. It is well known that many hold the view that this is not what the law should be, that times have moved on since 1969, and that the law is badly out-of-date, indeed antediluvian. That may be, and those who hold such views may be right, but our judicial duty is clear. As Sir Gorell Barnes P said in Dodd v Dodd [1906] P 189, 206, our task is jus dicere non jus dare – to state the law, not to make the law.
However, he then went on to say that the law does stay up to date:-
In one respect, however, the law permits, indeed requires us, to look at matters from the perspective of 2017. [This Act] is an "always speaking" statute... Although one cannot construe a statute as meaning something "conceptually different" from what Parliament must have intended..., where, as here, the statute is "always speaking" it is to be construed taking into account changes in our understanding of the natural world, technological changes, changes in social standards and, of particular importance here, changes in social attitudes.
He then went on to give an example:-
The concept of cruelty is the same today as it was when the Bill of Rights 1688 forbade the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments". But changes in social standards mean that punishments which would not have been regarded as cruel in 1688 will be so regarded today.
He also explained more in a family context:-
40. The most obvious application of the principle in family law relates to the concept of a child's "welfare", as the word was used in section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, now section 1 of the Children Act 1989. The concept of welfare is, no doubt, the same today as it was in 1925, but conceptions of that concept, to adopt the terminology of Professor Ronald Dworkin, or the content of the concept, to adopt the corresponding terminology of Lord Hoffmann in Birmingham City Council v Oakley [2001] 1 AC 617, 631, have changed and continue to change. A child's welfare is to be judged today by the standards of reasonable men and women in 2017 – not by the standards of their grandparents in 1925 or their parents in 1969 ... and having regard to the ever changing nature of our world, in particular, changes in social attitudes
41. So, in my judgment, when [the section of the Act] uses the words "cannot reasonably be expected", that objective test has to be addressed by reference to the standards of the reasonable man or woman on the Clapham omnibus: not the man on the horse-drawn omnibus in Victorian times which Lord Bowen would have had in mind, not the man or woman on the Routemaster clutching their paper bus ticket on the day in October 1969 when the 1969 Act received the Royal Assent, but the man or woman on the Boris Bus with their Oyster Card in 2017.
So it goes both ways.
The case went all the way to the Supreme Court where the divorce was refused. You can read the court of appeal and supreme court judgments here:-
Owens v Owens (2017) EWCA Civ 182
Owens v Owens (2018) UKSC 41