Interesting judgement. Especially the irrelevance of the HRA
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2020/3421.html
In short, the appellant had been convicted of an offence of improper use of a public communications network, contrary to section 127(2)(c) of the Communications Act 2003. She appealed, on grounds which included the assertion that such a conviction breached her ECHR Article 10 rights to freedom of expression. The Court of Appeal agreed with her (and also on the other substantive grounds for appeal), and quashed the conviction.
Some relevent quotes:
The [CPS] evidently did not appreciate the need to justify the prosecution, but saw it as the defendant's task to press the free speech argument. The prosecution argument failed entirely to acknowledge the well-established proposition that free speech encompasses the right to offend, and indeed to abuse another. The Judge appears to have considered that a criminal conviction was merited for acts of unkindness, and calling others names, and that such acts could only be justified if they made a contribution to a "proper debate".
The Judge evidently attached weight to the notion of a "debate" a word that appears nine times in her judgment. It is unclear from what source she drew the term. [...] It is not the law that individuals are only allowed to make personal remarks about others online if they do so as part of a "proper debate".
The protection of individuals from annoyance or inconvenience is not in itself a strong public policy imperative. [...] No convincing, relevant or sufficient reasons have been given for the decision to prosecute Ms Scottow under s 127 for those messages, and there was and is in my judgment no pressing social need to do so. A prosecution and conviction on these facts would represent a grossly disproportionate and entirely unjustified state interference with free speech.
If the prosecution argument accepted by the District Judge in this case were correct, it would create a curious anomaly under which a repeated message whose contents are intended to annoy, but which are not grossly offensive, menacing, indecent or obscene, nor known to be false, would be criminal if sent in a tweet or otherwise placed on an electronic network but not if conveyed orally or in print.
I do not consider that under s 127(2)(c) there is an offence of posting annoying tweets. I would reach that conclusion as a matter of domestic statutory interpretation without reference to the Human Rights Act, but once one takes Article 10 into account the position is even clearer.