Thanks for postIng judgement.
It doesn’t say his right to sex is more important than the safety for vulnerable women.
It’s basically that this man P is currently barred from forming any sexual relationships because he has been deemed unable to have the capacity to consent to sex himself. He has petitioned to have it recognized that he has the capacity to consent to sex.
The LA are against this and argue that even though he might understand consent for himself, he might not understand consent of a potential partner. So, they say he should not be considered to have the capacity to consent to sex.
The ruling is that in testing whether a person has the capacity to consent to sex, the focus should only be on that person and not whether they fully grasp consent in any potential partners.
The judge says here
“Further, in this context it is important to distinguish between the individual (and different) concepts of having the mental capacity to consent to sexual relations and exercising that capacity. In this respect,
Distilled into its essence, it seems to me that P's own choice, and his appreciation of that choice and the opportunity to refuse to consent, is an integral element of the capacity decision itself. Knowledge of the other party's consent to the proposed sexual activity is certainly relevant to the choice which then confronts P as to whether or not he (or she) goes ahead with that activity and thus its essentially lawful or unlawful nature.
If these conceptual issues are difficult enough for the capacitous to grasp, it seems to me that very great care is needed before imposing on the potentially incapacitous the need to understand these quasi-criminal principles and the potential for consent to be withdrawn by the other party at any stage. In my judgment, importing into the test for capacity and/or the information which informs that test a requirement for an understanding of parallel and continuing consent in a sexual partner imposes a test which is set too high. I do not accept that it is appropriate to increase the bar for the potentially incapacitous and thus potentially deprive them of a fundamental and basic human right to participate in sexual relations merely because the raising of that bar might provide protection for either P himself or for any victim of non-consensual sex when those consequences are viewed through the prism of the criminal law.”
The judge doesnt say P can just exercise his capacity unsupervised, vulnerable women will still be protected. It’s just saying that the fact P needs supervision doesn’t mean he cannot consent to sex himself.n