I copied and pasted this from the Heads of arguments. It really helped me understand the laws.
In order for Oscar Pistorius to be found guilty of murder he had to have intent to kill Reeva and Reeva only. He had to know it was her in the toilet and he had to reconcile himself to that fact and fire into the door anyway.
It was not proven by the State that there was an argument. Mrs van de Merwe's testimony was that she heard a woman's voice that sounded like she was arguing. She could not say where it was coming from, what they were saying or what language was being spoken. She also only heard one person's voice on and off for an hour. That does not prove it was indeed Oscar Pistorius and Reeva Steencamp were in an argument. The security guard activated his guard track in front of his immediate neighbors house at 2:20am and saw no sign of trouble at the house.
Mr Nel tried to imply Error in Persona by saying
The accused said to witnesses on the scene that he thought
she was an intruder. Even then, the accused shot with the direct intention to kill a person. An error in persona, will not affect, the intention to kill a human being.
Error in persona” (mistake about the identity of the person) only finds
application where an accused intended to kill the identified “specific
predetermined individual” but made a mistake as to the identity of that
individual . His mistake will not constitute a defence.
Error in persona” does not apply to the present case. Rather, what
the State seeks to do is to introduce the doctrine of transferred intent/malice, which does not form part of SA law.
Doctrine of Transferred Intent/Malice
The State’s argument is that even if the State did not prove the fundamental requirement that the Accused subjectively foresaw the possibility that the Deceased could be killed, he ought still to be convicted of murder in respect of the Deceased.
Here us an example
“X’s intent to kill must relate to the very person killed. This does
not mean that X must know the identity of the intended victim. It
means that cases of aberratio ictus
are not murder for our law rejects the doctrine of ‘transferred malice’; if
Here is an example:
X shoots Z intending to kill him and not foreseeing the possibility that the shot may kill Y instead, X has no intent to kill Y, and cannot be convicted of murdering Y. If in the situation X foresees that his bullet may kill Y)
(notwithstanding that he has no desire, in the emotional sense, to kill Y)
X has intent to kill Y and is guilty of murder.