Isn't there some mystery over some viruses that just seem to lose virulence ?
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4361674/
would be a good starting point ...
I ask, because it's hard not to imagine " Boris 2.0" and his dimchums crossing their fingers behind their backs and hoping for a natural lessening in virulence as the "solution", rather than having to actually decide anything. Well I can imagine, anyway.
Oh, and once again, if anyone dares to try and soapytitwank you about "nobody could have foreseen" as a rather pathetic attempt to excuse incompetence with ignorance, in looking in the the above, I discovered this
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK234858/
( Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States. )
from nineteen ninty fucking two - 28 years ago ... here's some highlights from the preface ....
<strong>Perceiving the Threats:</strong> The emergence of HIV disease has stimulated a high level of interest in the scientific, medical, public health, and policymaking communities. By and large, however, awareness of and concern about the threats to human health posed by other emerging and reemerging microbial diseases remain critically low. A small minority, mainly infectious disease specialists, have for years warned of the potential for serious epidemics and our lack of preparedness for them. In what can only be called a general mood of complacency, these warnings have gone largely unheeded.
<strong>Detecting the Threats:</strong> Surveillance is the primary means by which the incidence of established diseases is monitored and outbreaks of new diseases are detected. The domestic disease surveillance network in the United States is being scaled back as a result of fiscal problems in many states, raising concerns about its ability to perform a vital public health function. Equally worrisome, the existing international surveillance networks are focused on little more than a handful of well-defined diseases, and U.S. involvement in this worldwide effort is diminishing. Epidemiological knowledge of most globally important diseases is incomplete at best; for many there is very little information.
<strong>Understanding the Threats:</strong> Despite progress in basic and applied infectious disease research, gaps remain in our knowledge about most bacteria, viruses, protozoans, helminths, and fungi. These scientific ''blind spots" have slowed or prevented efforts to understand the variety of factors responsible for disease emergence and reemergence. The diversion of funds for emergencies or, in some cases, inconsistent levels of funding have made it especially difficult to address the full range of research opportunities and needs.
<strong>Responding to the Threats:</strong> Once emerging microbial threats are detected, responses to them are often feeble. Diseases that appear not to threaten the United States directly rarely elicit the political support necessary to maintain control efforts. U.S. support for surveillance, control, and research activities in other countries is extremely limited. Here, as in other nations, failure to sustain domestic efforts to control infectious diseases is an equally serious problem. Ill-informed decision making can prevent accurate assessments of the actual danger posed by microbial threats to health, and it can slow or even halt steps to address an emerging disease problem. Ironically, these same forces can produce an overresponse to less serious situations. Finally, profit and liability concerns have undercut the market incentives for manufacturers of vaccines, drugs, and pesticides to develop and distribute needed supplies to the most impoverished populations both in the United States and in other countries.