The Good Friday Agreement is made up of two parts – the Multi-party agreement between most of the political parties (but not the DUP) and the British-Irish Agreement between the two governments.
This second Agreement is the international treaty between sovereign states, registered with the UN. The British-Irish Agreement’s function is to uphold the multi-party agreement. So changing the treaty would logically require a new multi-party agreement.
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In terms of Brexit impact Strand 2 is most significant. It sets out that the North-South Ministerial Council, which promotes all-island cooperation, will “consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes…”
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Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, states: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” So Britain cannot, under international law, set aside the GFA because it voted for Brexit.
So the “peace dividend” disappears and work on community regeneration and reconciliation loses funding just at the time a hard border becomes a very real possibility.
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Also at risk the Special EU Programmes Body which was one of the North-South implementation bodies set up under the GFA and delivery agent for the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in the north. No EU, No SEUPB. No money.
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when a 20 year process which has allowed people to begin to express their identity, culture and tradition is eroded, then you undermine the process of peace.
The workability of the Good Friday Agreement is as much about what it signifies as what it says. It signifies compromise, recognition and acceptance and a pledge to work together for the common good.
Exactly the opposite of what a hard border does, in fact.