Some interesting insights from Jon B. Alterman, director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Here's what I feel are the most interesting parts:
"Hamas was probably more successful than it thought it would be, but also more successful than it should have been for its own good.....Hamas aimed to penetrate Israel in a way that would give it centrality and relevance for decades to come, but by killing hundreds of Israelis and taking 150 hostages in the first days, Hamas has put itself in an impossible position. Israel is united in its determination to change the status quo ante and completely push Hamas from power. It is hard to imagine that Hamas will be able to retain power in Gaza when the dust settles. There may be hope for the Palestinian national cause, but there’s very little hope for Hamas."
And:
"Since Hamas took power in 2007, the Israeli military periodically would go into Gaza, fight with Hamas, and destroy some of its infrastructure. Hamas would rebuild for a few years, and then the cycle would repeat itself. Israelis called this “mowing the grass,” an unpleasant but necessary repetitive task. This cycle is no longer going to be acceptable to the Israeli public or political leadership. Now, the question is what kind of government will emerge in Gaza after the war. It might entail greater control for the Palestinian National Authority based in Ramallah, some sort of new local governance, governance under the tutelage of the Israeli military, or perhaps a coalition of Arab states. There are a lot of possibilities, but it is hard to imagine that Hamas can remain in power."
On the hostages:
"It is unclear how Hamas is going to try to use social media as a tool in the hostage crisis. Strategically, Israel will likely act irrespective of the hostages while tactically trying to free hostages in any way that it can. Social media coverage of the hostages could change this, but it is unlikely."
On Hezbollah:
"Hezbollah feels it has a lot to lose. The Lebanese economy is in crisis. Lebanon went from being a middle-income state to a state where 80 to 85 percent of the population is below the poverty line. There is no question that an all-out war with Israel would result in the complete destruction of the south and large-scale destruction in other parts of Lebanon, and Hezbollah does not know if it could survive that outcome. Lebanon is very vulnerable now, and the last thing it needs is another war with Israel.....
Israel’s instinct is not to get into a spiral of escalation with Hezbollah that can turn this into a two-front war, especially because Hezbollah is much better armed than Hamas. Hezbollah has up to 150,000 rockets and missiles, many of which were supplied through Syria. It is spread over a much larger area than the Gaza Strip. And Israel does not control all the access points to Lebanon the way it controls the access points to the Gaza Strip."
On the potential role of Arab Governments:
"Israel and the Arab states are strategically aligned on Gaza. Virtually all Arab governments are hostile to Hamas, which is essentially the Palestinian version of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of these states have outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and jailed its members. They also fear the tentacles of Iran, which has helped bankroll Hamas and trained some of its fighters. Arab governments may have a role in helping shape a political outcome in Gaza that simultaneously helps advance Palestinian national aspirations while also dealing a blow to Islamist movements and Iranian proxies."
Link: www.csis.org/analysis/hamas-and-israel-current-situation-and-looking-ahead