I think I see what the objection is now. With appreciation to @MarieDeGournay, rather than re-argue the specific points , some of which were badly stated and others which were in error, let me restate my position:
Skrmetti might have been narrow in some sense, but it's effects are broad and seismic. This can be seen in practice as it allow the court to cleanly grant the stay requested in Orr v. Trump (the passport case).
In Orr, SCOTUS sided with the Trump administration and accepted the requested stay on the State Department rule stipulating that biological sex be used for the US passport sex marker. SCOTUS did not mention Skrmetti directly in granting the stay, but Jackson’s dissent criticises the majority’s reasoning in ways that track the framework established in that case. In addition the government’s lawyers rely heavily on the ruling, explicitly treating United States v. Skrmetti as the controlling precedent. This includes relying on the ruling for
- the definition of sex,
- the level of scrutiny
- the irrelevance of medical consensus,
- the rational-basis standard, and the
- invalid-ness of transgender identity as a category, i.e. not a quasi-suspect class and not an immutable characteristic, even though this was in the concurring opinion.
With respect to the last, the following passage appears in the administration’s stay application, where the government quotes and relies on concurrence language from Skrmetti to support its immutability argument.
“In any event, trans-identifying people do not satisfy respondents’ preferred test. First, trans-identifying people are not marked by the “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics” of a “discrete group.” Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. at 1851 (Barrett, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see id. at 1866 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). “
So, it’s clear Skrmetti is an extremely important case with broad implications in transgender law. It’s also reasonable to point out that it’s full relevance (including in Orr) remains to be determined as the case law is worked out.
With respect to what Skrmetti actually held, you are correct that the Supreme Court did not adopt the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, so that reasoning is not part of the national precedent. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis remains persuasive within that circuit, but it does not bind other courts. The fact that the Sixth Circuit’s judgement was upheld, combined with the concurring opinions’ articulation of immutability, explains why government attorneys felt justified citing the case when making the immutability argument. And while concurring opinions do not carry the force of law, they often have more interpretive weight than dissents.
I’m more than happy to admit that the full implications of the Skrmetti haven’t been worked out in law, but I stand by my assertion that it’s already clear that it's broadly important. In addition, I think there’s good evidence that the court desires to set down precedent that insists that transgender identity and biological sex are separate in federal law and that Skrmetti was the first step in establishing that doctrine.