Maya Forstater posted about the judgement in the final case taken by Master McCloud. I've posted one section below - neither party to the case asked for Master McCloud to be recused and this consideration of recusal was carried out after the case had finished being heard. The case in question did not involve any trans people (other than Master McCloud)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2024/2595.html
"Consideration of Recusal
Behind this case, as I have noted, we have a woman who alleged rape and whose centrality must not be diminished.
The position has been expressed publicly by current and former Ministers of the Crown and by some in the Law, during the currency of this case, that people who are transsexual are the embodiment and expression of a 'transgender ideology' (sometimes 'gender ideology'), or that steps must be taken to protect women from transsexual people by isolation or segregative legal measures in some contexts which have been canvassed in the UK for implementation. The essence of the belief is that people such as this judge make a choice to be transsexual, are biassed against women, deny their experience (or deny the existence of sex at all, or assert multiple sexes), are a threat to women and children if they share a space with them, and seek to gain access to positions of influence with manipulative intent, which is to say therefore also in bad faith.
The belief that there exists such an 'ideology' is of uncertain source. Some argue that it originates from religious principles; others perceive it as a recent evolution of secular radical feminism. That is for the social historians: it need not be considered here and I express no settled view. An interested reader in search of a rabbit-hole may refer, as hopping-off points, to the texts of EU Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2417 (2022)[1] at paragraph 5 and the EU Parliamentary report of July 2021 (reference PE 653.644)[2] prepared for the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE).
The dilemma for the sole judge from the transsexual community is that all judges are appointed by the Crown, must bear the Crown's trust and confidence, and cannot remain if they lose that trust. This judgment is a 'hang over' from one of my final hearings prior to my (in the circumstances inevitable) departure from the Bench. It is that fact which means I must address recusal because of the facts of this particular case which I have already mentioned.
No objection was put to me by either side to my dealing with the case but in the circumstances I felt obliged to consider whether I should give a decision or withdraw, despite having concluded the hearings in the case.
In the event (see my judgment below) I have decided that the conduct of the litigation in the context and seriousness of the issues relating to the rape and assault complainant and how the robust positions on either side may or may not have been appropriate, is a matter for the Costs Judge under CPR rule 44.11. Therefore I have not had to weigh such sensitive aspects into my consideration further. Having excluded that aspect from my reasoning, in my judgment it is unlikely that a fair minded, reasonable member of the public would consider that there is a real risk of bias.
Weighing in my decision is that the parties rightly expect a decision, have incurred the time and cost of the case and have given me the privilege and duty of hearing it. To recuse myself would amount to a waste of court resources on a considerable scale.
There seems to me to be a difference between accepting that Ministers on behalf of the Crown may express a lack of confidence in a judge, necessitating her stepping down, by expressing a view that persons such as her are a risk or threat, versus tolerating Ministerial or external impact on a specific case or decision, on the other. Recognising the first is merely to recognise the misfortune of one's own accident of birth and the shifting sands of social tolerance, but to allow the second would be to betray the judicial oath, and I will not do that.
The first duty of a judge, and now my last, is to decide the case and to give reasons for her decision. That is what I shall do"