In Bell, Tavi said:
"There is a fundamental misunderstanding in your letter, which states that parents can consent to pubertal suspension on behalf of a child who is not capable of doing so. This is not the case for this service, as is clear from the above. Although the general law would permit parent(s) to consent on behalf of their child, GIDS has never administered, nor can it conceive of any situation where it would be appropriate to administer blockers on a patient without their consent. The Service Specification confirms that this is the case.
And in this case they are saying:
"In relation to referral from GIDS to the endocrine team, the Tavistock would only proceed to refer for treatment where i) it is the clear wish of the young person to be referred for assessment by the endocrinologist and that they understand the nature of the referral (even if their level of understanding falls short of the requirements for 'Gillick Competence' as delineated in the Divisional Court's judgment in Bell); ii) with the agreement and support of the child or young person's parent(s)/carer(s); and iii) with the agreement and recommendation from the clinicians working with the child or young person."
So whose consent are they now relying on?
The 'clear wish of the young person to be referred' is not 'consent' - that's what the Bell judgment says - and Tavi said very clearly in Bell that they would not proceed on the basis of parental consent.
If they have done a complete 180 and are now relying on parental consent, and if puberty blockers are an essential, lifesaving treatment for children with gender dysphoria, then wouldn't it be extremely negligent not to proceed even if the child did not express a clear wish to be referred? My children never expressed a clear wish to go to the dentist, in fact they frequently expressed a clear wish not to go. I used my parental consent to override their wishes and took them anyway. To do otherwise would have been negligent.
GIDS statement in this case suggests to me that they are still, in practice, seeking to rely on the child's 'consent' - they've just rebranded it as the child's 'clear wish' which, unlike consent, has no legal weight.
'GIDS has never administered, nor can it conceive of any situation where it would be appropriate to administer blockers on a patient without their consent clear wish'
I am astonished at GIDS dishonesty and at the failure of the court to see through this semantic sleight of hand.
Or maybe PBs aren't an essential, lifesaving treatment after all. The Royal College of Surgeons says in its Professional Standards for Cosmetic Surgery:
34. A parent can consent to an intervention for a child or young person who does not have the maturity and capacity to make the decision, but you should involve the child in the decision as much as possible. If you judge that the child does not want to have the intervention, then you must not perform it.
www.rcseng.ac.uk/standards-and-research/standards-and-guidance/service-standards/cosmetic-surgery/professional-standards-for-cosmetic-surgery/
That's the consent model GIDS are now seeking to use. It's very different from the way the NHS treats consent for essential, life saving treatments on minors, or even routine medical treatments.
But if PBs are so inessential then why are children being given this experimental and potentially extremely harmful treatment in the first place?