A timely reminder landed in my inbox this morning: here is the summary of a judgment by Nick Wall in the High Court on 1st Feb.
The court ordered supervised contact to take place between children and their paternal grandparents at a contact centre and explained the careful approach taken to such issues by the court.
Case name 1) CW (2) CHW & BAW v (1) TW (2) OW & YW (BY THEIR GUARDIAN AD LITEM, NYAS) (2011)
The court was required to determine the application of a mother (M) to commit a father (F) to prison for breach of a court order, and an application by paternal grandparents (G) for contact with the children. The children were aged 10 and 12. F and M were separated and involved in a dispute concerning contact. By order of the court, F had been banned from approaching or entering the school which his children attended. A penal notice was attached to the order. M complained that F had breached the order by sitting in his car close to the children's school. Her complaint was supported by the evidence of a police officer who had approached F. The children's guardian submitted that contact could be arranged with G but it should be supervised in a contact centre, and it had to be independent of F.
HELD: (1) There did not appear to be a formal committal summons amongst the papers in support of M's application. That was a serious procedural defect. However, M was acting in person, and the court was satisfied that F had been fully notified of the allegations against him. What mattered in committal proceedings was justice and provided procedural technicalities did not interfere with the overall justice of the case they could be overlooked. The police officer had seen and spoken to F and was unequivocal in his evidence that F had stopped his car near to the school. In those circumstances, applying the criminal standard of proof, F was in breach of the court's order and was in contempt of court. Such a breach was not trivial, and the matter was adjourned for sentencing (see paras 17-18, 22, 24-26 of judgment). (2) G believed passionately that F had been badly treated and that even if he had behaved badly he was the victim of maternal intransigence, judicial self-importance and poor judgment. In that, they were wrong. Any objective reader of the papers would come unhesitatingly to the following conclusions: (a) that F had brought the situation entirely upon himself; (b) that the judges who had dealt with the case were right, were deeply reluctant in the long term to cut the children off from contact with F, but had been left with no alternative; (c) that G, by their partisan attitude, were in danger of making the children's situation more difficult. The court fully understood that G were desperate to see their grandchildren, but that was not the test. The test was whether it was in the interests of the children for such contact to take place. G's wholesale support for F and their hostility to M were strong pointers against contact. The parents' disagreements and F's conduct were not the children's responsibility. Grandparents usually had the capacity to deliver the vital quality of normality, as they were normally above the fray. They could provide a haven for children whilst keeping them in touch with the absent side of their family. However, the question was whether G could do that. The court concluded that they could. G appeared to recognise that if contact took place at their home they would find it impossible to keep F away. G also recognised the harm that the children could suffer if they sought to proselytise F's case to them (paras 9-10, 12, 31-32). (3) A single supervised visit was to be arranged of no more than two hours at a contact centre on a date to be fixed. F should not be physically present, in the vicinity, or on the telephone. A fresh report should then be prepared so that the court could consider the matter further (para.33).