Sex without a condom when that was not agreed effectively means sex without consent: Scroll down to conditional consent. This is from
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/rape_and_sexual_offences/consent/#a07
Reasonable belief in consent
Deciding whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps (A) has taken to ascertain whether (B) consents (subsection (2) of sections 1-4). It is likely that this will include a defendant's attributes, such as disability or extreme youth, but not if (s)he has any particular fetishes.
The Act abolished the Morgan defence of a genuine though unreasonably mistaken belief as to the consent of the complainant. The defendant (A) has the responsibility to ensure that (B) consents to the sexual activity at the time in question. It will be important for the police to ask the offender in interview what steps (s)he took to satisfy him or herself that the complainant consented in order to show his or her state of mind at the time.
The test of reasonable belief is a subjective test with an objective element. The best way of dealing with this issue is to ask two questions:
Did the defendant believe the complainant consented? This relates to his or her personal capacity to evaluate consent (the subjective element of the test).
If so, did the defendant reasonably believe it? It will be for the jury to decide if his or her belief was reasonable (the objective element).
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Evidential presumptions (section 75)
Section 75 lists the circumstances in which rebuttable evidential presumptions about the absence of consent apply. If the defendant did the relevant act, as defined in section 77 (the sexual activity within sections 1-4), and the circumstances specified in subsection (2) exist and the defendant knew they existed, then the complainant is to be taken not to have consented.
The Act imposes an evidential burden on the defendant to adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue that the complainant consented and whether or not the defendant reasonably believed the complainant consented. The question whether the defendant adduces sufficient evidence to raise an issue to be left to a jury is a matter for the judge. The issue should be left to a jury where the evidence, if accepted, raises a prima facie case. Once the defendant has done this, it will be for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant did not consent and that the defendant did not reasonably believe the complainant consented.
Prosecutors should note that in practice the evidential presumptions very rarely apply.
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Conclusive presumptions (section 76)
Section 76 provides two conclusive presumptions that the complainant did not consent to the activity and the defendant did not believe that the complainant consented.
The first presumption, based on the defendant intentionally deceiving the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the relevant act, has been the subject of discussion in several cases including:
In R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699 where the defendant had deceived the complainant and pressured her into having sexual intercourse more frequently than she would have done otherwise, the conclusive presumption did not apply because there had been no deception as to the nature or purpose of sexual intercourse.
In R v Tabassum [2002] 2 Cr App R 328 where the defendant conducted breast examinations for his own sexual gratification, on the pretence that he was collecting data for a cancer screening programme there was no genuine consent because the complainants had consented only to an act of a medical nature and not for any other reason.
In R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527 the conviction of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent was upheld where the defendant in order to embarrass his victim, posed as a young woman and persuaded him to masturbate in front of a webcam.
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'Conditional' Consent
Section 74 has recently been considered by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in a series of cases where ostensible consent in relation to sexual offences was considered not to be true consent, either because a condition upon which consent was given was not complied with or because of a material deception (other than one which falls within section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 [SOA]). The resultant judgments identified three sets of circumstances in which consent to sexual activity might be vitiated where the condition was breached.
In Julian Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin), an extradition case, the President of the Queens Bench Division considered the situation in which Mr Assange knew that AA would only consent to sexual intercourse if he used a condom. Rejecting the view that the conclusive presumption in section 76 of the SOA would apply in these circumstances the President concluded that the "issue of materiality ...can be determined under section 74 rather than section 76".
On the specific facts the President said:
"It would plainly be open to a jury to hold that if AA had made clear that she would only consent to sexual intercourse if Mr Assange used a condom, then there would be no consent if, without her consent, he did not use a condom, or removed or tore the condom ..... His conduct in having sexual intercourse without a condom in circumstances where she had made clear she would only have sexual intercourse if he used a condom would therefore amount to an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003...."
In R (on the application of F) v The DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin), the High Court examined an application for judicial review of the refusal of the DPP to initiate a prosecution for rape and/or sexual assault of the complainant by her former partner. "Choice" and the "freedom" to make any particular choice must, the Court said, be approached in "a broad commonsense way".
Against what the Court described as the "essential background" of the complainant's partner's "sexual dominance" and the complainant's "unenthusiastic acquiescence to his demands", the Court considered a specific incident when the claimant consented to sexual intercourse only on the clear understanding that her partner would not ejaculate inside her vagina. She believed that he intended and agreed to withdraw before ejaculation, and he knew and understood that this was the only basis on which she was prepared to have sexual intercourse with him. When he deliberately ejaculated inside the complainant, the result, the Court stated was:
"She was deprived of choice relating to the crucial feature on which her original consent to sexual intercourse was based. Accordingly her consent was negated. Contrary to her wishes, and knowing that she would not have consented, and did not consent to penetration or the continuation of penetration if she had any inkling of his intention, he deliberately ejaculated within her vagina. In law, this combination of circumstances falls within the statutory definition of rape".